Social History of Pakistan

Here, we live our own version of the British sitcom Downtown Abbey, in which the landed gentry lived in comfort above while their menial staff slaved in the pantry below. In that series, when the young daughter of the aristocrat lapses by marrying their driver, it is the driver who moves up the social ladder into the big house, not the other way round. A serial shown on a local television channel had a parallel storyline with a difference. A middle-class Pakistani father discovers his daughter is interested in some boy of whom he disapproves. Irate, he forces her to marry their young servant, and when that marriage collapses (the servant becomes more interested in his master’s wealth than his daughter), the father makes her marry her juvenile underage cousin. Millions of families throughout Pakistan must have watched that serial and empathized with the trauma of the young girl. Not one of them is likely to recall the plight of the teenaged housemaids assaulted or beaten to death by their educated employers. If anything of them remains, it will be as statistics in a thin file, buried in the cemetery known as police records. In Pakistan, the good die young; poor housemaids die even younger. Whoever chooses to write a social history of Pakistan will find it difficult to pinpoint the exact moment our hearts stopped beating for our fellow citizens. Was it in the 1950s when the anti-Ahmad riots stained the Mall at Lahore red? Was it when we chose after 1971 to ignore the sufferings of the thousands of prisoners of war and civilians in protective custody? Was it when in 2007 we watched the streets of Rawalpindi being hosed down, diluting a fallen leader’s blood as it trickled down the drain? Or was it when we saw body bags being delivered to hospitals throughout the country as if they were daily medical supplies? Of course, there never is any one single trauma, no unique Pearl Harbor, that causes a nation to galvanism into a unified remonstrance. Reaction to tragedy is a slow process. It takes time. Meanwhile, crises, like the relentless drip of water on a prisoner’s forehead, gradually numb a people’s consciousness into an inert, unresisting acceptance. Pakistan can be described as a country whose leadership over the years has institutionalism callousness and indifference to a level where it is indistinguishable from public policy. The state’s ownership of its citizens has been privatized. It no longer has a stake or interest in them. Were doomsday to occur tomorrow, were Pakistan to implode suddenly, it would solve all its myriad problems. It would certainly satisfy many an armchair Cassandra. Countries with a population of over 180 million humans, however, do not disappear into a black hole of non-existence. They continue to exist because like Mount Everest they are there. The more mundane reason is that international creditors cannot bring themselves to unplug the life-support system that sustains such bedridden economies. The truth is nations survive because ultimately the will of the people is more resilient than the willful Terrance of its leadership. In India, class barriers have been eroded by the tsunami of widespread education. In Pakistan, class barriers have themselves become the barriers to the wider dissemination of education. And again, while India has demonstrated that mass education produces a vibrant middle class, Pakistan has inverted that maxim and made the middle class responsible for its own education. Anyone in government concerned with education would be hard-pressed to provide a clear vision of the contours of Pakistanis in 2030. Will they be open-minded citizens capable of integrating in a modern world? Will they continue to remain stratified in the present class distinctions? Or will they migrate and clear tables in Toronto? There are some who would maintain that the churning of a troubled childhood produces geniuses. Take Charles Dickens and Charlie Chaplin. Both of them spent their precious childhood doing menial labor. Dr Abdul Salam (our sole Nobel laureate) came from a backwater: Ghanaian in Jhang district. Dr Salam’s birthday anniversary on Jan 29 should be celebrated as our equivalent of Martin Luther King Day in the US. King lived and died championing emancipation; Salam lived and died advocating education.

Miltry Opration

Operation Zarb-e-Azb, launched against militants in North Waziristan by the Pakistani military on 15 June is now entering the second phase of clearing and reclaiming lost spaces. A few days ago, Miranshah, an important city, was 80% reclaimed and for the first time since the launch of the operation, the press corps was allowed a guided tour of the place. The Operation was on the cards for a very long time and a recent interview of the previous military spokesperson in which he hinted an intentional delay by the previous military chief, has added to the list of controversies as to why this decision took so long to be set into motion. The public sentiment was unanimously against the militants and terrorists and heavily in favour of a Sri Lanka type operation that brought down the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam, without realising the pros and cons of the problem. Simultaneously, a faction comprising the clergy, their supporters and empathisers as well as political parties pitched dialogue with the angry and disgruntled brethren as a means to appease and bring them back in the mainstream. Though the collateral part couldn’t more be accurate, since the 1980s Afghan war, Pakistan has undergone a drastic transformation, which has affected the entire socio-political, economic and cultural fabric of the society. The decision-makers of the Cold War days, judging the geopolitical developments, made critical but misinformed decisions which served well in short term but proved disastrous in the long term. Resultantly, two generations have paid a heavy price for the militancy and terrorism that haunts their daily lives. Therefore, the argument that this is not our war is as far from the truth as the US’ initial claims of innocence over state failure in Afghanistan. The elected leadership initially favoured and opted for an almost unconditional dialogue with the Tehrik–i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operating in the concerned area alone, against stiff public uproar and opposition from political parties and concerned quarters. In one sense, the offer and opening a channel for dialogue was a good tactical measure; but it had two severe consequences: the military lost precious time and the militants gained advantage and crossed over to safer areas across border or any other place of choice, with their men and firepower. The militants, as they gained time, took the inaction and a general lack of consensus in the political ranks as a sign of weakness and inflicted heavy damages which included the mass killing of 26 captured security personnel, and mounted attacks on Karachi Airport. Any harboured illusions have since been laid to rest and since mid-June, the Pakistani armed forces are engaged in the military operation. With 30,000 troops committed to clear militant sanctuaries, strongholds and hideouts from the two main areas of Miranshah and Mirali, the task at hand has been enormous. The timing was bad, given that summer could not be more unsuitable for the troops, compounded by the beginning of the Islamic month of Ramzan within a fortnight of the operation. The herculean task of evacuation and safe passage to the local population, whose numbers according to the available data was around 500,000 but by now the authorities have a registered a figure around 833, 274 people. Furthermore, Pakistani authorities, after repeated requests, managed to secure the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul’s cooperation in sealing the border – especially in Nuristan and Kunar provinces, and also disallow sanctuaries to fleeing militants on Afghan soil; but this arrangement now appears in jeopardy after a fatal strike from the Afghan side on a Pakistani military patrol, claiming several lives. The resolve with which the military is dealing this decisive blow is evident to all, but not without skeptics and criticism. The prime criticism is that the military strike occurred too late in the day, allowing an easy and timely escape to the main culprits. Yet, the zero tolerance policy towards the TTP and its local or foreign affiliates is what was long needed. In the absence of an embedded media, the only narrative available is the military’s. In response, the military provided a guided tour of the 80% cleared town of Miran shah to the media. Will the military operation be sufficient in flushing out the militants and the larger issue of terrorism? Definitely not. This is just one aspect of the larger nationwide effort, which needs to tackle militant strongholds and nurseries in other parts of the country; check the inflow of money and support these actors receive from all quarters; maintain a zero tolerance approach, and strengthen governance, law and order as well as judicial protocols in handling such issues. This won’t be easy, given how despite a public demand for stiffer security measures, the Protection of Pakistan ordinance (POPO) has met with enormous criticism. To date, the authorities remain indecisive over the placement of the National Counter-terrorism Authority. At the moment, the greater challenge is the assistance and finally rehabilitation and resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons, supplemented by developing infrastructure and self-sustaining institutional mechanisms for the affected population. It is high time the government breaks old great game buffer myths, abolish the British made FCR, and accord full provincial status to the seven agencies. The success of the Operation will carry positive dividends for both Pakistan and Afghanistan. There is a need to stand united for a sustained, stable and peaceful future that can help assure prosperity and better regional relations.